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Meta-Theoretical Paradigms Underpinning Risk in Child Welfare: Towards a 
Position of Methodological Pragmatism  
The aim of this paper is to explore the ‘natural attitude’ underpinning risk practices in child 
welfare. This refers to various taken-for-granted approaches to risk that social workers and 
other human service professionals draw upon in their everyday practice. The approach 
proceeds by identifying and critically examining three key, meta-theoretical paradigms on 
risk which typically shape the natural attitude. They are labelled ‘objectivist, ‘subjectivist’ 
and ‘critical’. The ontological, epistemological, axiological and methodological premises 
supporting each paradigm, and how they shape risk practices, are then reviewed leading to 
a composite, meta-theoretical position on risk termed ‘methodological pragmatism’. This 
position draws on the strengths of each paradigm and is formulated into ten propositions 
which consider how risk should be approached in child welfare. Within this corpus of 
thought salient themes are endorsed such as the need for method triangulation, an 
examination of ‘deep causality’, and the promotion of emancipatory perspectives. By 
critically reflecting on meta-theory, the paper contributes to the development of 
substantive theories of risk assessment and management in child welfare. 
Key words: Risk, child welfare, meta-theory, paradigms 
Introduction 
Risk continues to exercise the collective imagination in contemporary society. Whether the 
threat emanates from environmental disaster, economic melt-down, international 
terrorism, large scale epidemics or the vagaries of the lifecourse, our collective 
preoccupation with risk assessment, prediction and safety, still makes Ulrich Beck’s (1992) 
watershed thesis on the ‘risk society’ apposite for today’s world.  This axiom takes on a 
particular purchase when we consider current discourses and approaches to risk in child 
welfare.  In this context, risk has been medicalised, legalised and professionalised (Barsky, 
2009; Lonne et al, 2009). We see these trends within various organisational contexts in 
social work, where an instrumental approach has been applied to the management of risk, 
often shoe-horning it into a framework of audit and governance – a trend that is counter-
inituitive, some argue (Kemshall, 2009; Broadhurst et al, 2010), given the inherently 
complex, contingent, negotiated, and multi-factorial nature of risk in social life. 
Yet, despite these complexities, many social workers in child welfare engage in risk-led 
practice in a routinised way. Tellingly, one might opine that risk has become so dominant a 
lens it is now part of the profession’s natural attitude, shaping the heuristics professionals 
use in a taken-for-granted way to make sense of complex situations. For some practitioners 
(depending on their location and setting), the natural attitude reflects a calculative stance, 
one that draws on actuarial principles; for others, the use of clinical judgement is the 
preferred modus operandi. This bifurcation has, at times, escalated into what White and 
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Walsh (2006) refer to as the ‘risk assessment wars’. Regardless of what stance is taken, 
though, and how it is critically interogated, a gap in the literature remains evident. This 
refers to the limited attention given to the meta-theories underpinning these various, taken-
for-granted, risk practices in child welfare. 
Meta-theory addresses questions of ontology (referring to our ‘being’ in the world), 
epistemology (related to ways of knowing) and axiology (concerning the nature of values).  
In this way, it deals with first-order philosophical premises about existence and the nature 
of society. Moreover, it lays the conceptual ground for the development of substantive 
theories in the social sciences (Sibeon, 2004). These are specific bodies of knowledge 
providing a more detailed understanding and explanation of different aspects of life such as, 
inter alia, human identity (Lawler, 2008) and the life course (Hunt, 2005). More broadly, a 
return to meta-theory enables the inquirer to understand, critique and improve substantive 
theory from the perspective of overarching views about social actors and social life. 
The aim of this paper is, therefore, to define and consider the range of meta-theoretical 
premises on risk and how they shape the natural attitude supporting different risk practices 
with children facing various hazards in social life. In taking this step, I identify three 
overarching, meta-theoretical paradigms on risk and examine their ontological, 
epistemological, axiological and methodological suppositions. The strengths and 
weaknesses of each paradigm are then briefly appraised leading to an argument for a 
methodological pragmatism embracing an alignment of aspects of all three. Simply put, this 
suggests risk practices must be seen in the context of enabling and constraining psycho-
social structures (which are often hidden from empirical register) and the impact of human 
agency. In this conception, risk practices are seen as the outcome of human intention and 
activity yet occur within the context of reproduced rules, norms and power, all of which 
circumscribe or limit creative action. 
This exercise in philosophical and conceptual deliberation is much needed if we are to 
understand more fully contemporary risk in human welfare and how to respond to it with 
greater insight. Reflecting on meta-theory brings us back to fundamental assumptions 
which, if left uninspected, continue to mould actions in the empirical world. Our deepest 
beliefs, which are often implicitly held, influence what Giddens (1987) referred to as 
practical consciousness: how we act in an automatic way, ‘doing things’ instinctually rather 
than cogitating on them deliberately. Practical consciousness is like the beam of a torch 
lightening up only certain parts of a path while neglecting the wider terrain. Meta-theory 
illuminates this broader canvass of social life enabling us to challenge the wisdom of 
received ideas and long-held shibboleths.  
This is an inquiry that moves from surface to depth, excavating unchallenged notions of risk 
lying behind the meniscus of everyday social work practice and therefore is congruent with 
a Socratic disposition which examines closely the prevailing order from a critical perspective. 
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The aim, in all of this, is to enhance practices making them more sensitive to lived 
experience, more value-oriented (challenging oppressive mechanisms) and more informed 
about the nature of the social domains affecting outcomes in the lifecourse. Risk is such a 
contested, emotionally charged and agonised concept and, as such, needs to be 
deconstructed if we are to make meaningful headway towards more enlightened practices. 
Key Meta-Theoretical Paradigms on Risk 
I argue there are three prominent, meta-theoretical paradigms informing risk practices in 
child welfare and have labelled them ‘objectivist’, ‘subjectivist’ and ‘critical’ (see Table 1 
below). In reaching this particular formulation I have drawn on and re-worked the seminal 
contributions from Burrell and Morgan (1979) and Chua (1986) on the nature of sociological 
paradigms. For these theorists, paradigmatic assumptions are mainly shaped by 
objectivist/positivist ontologies on the one hand, and subjectivist/interpretivist ontologies, 
on the other. Based on Dahrendorf’s (1959) sociological theory, they also posit that 
fundamental questions about the nature of society are formative in shaping the sociological 
imagination. More specifically, they concentrate on whether society is fundamentally held 
together by consensual relations and social order, the classic Parsonian view (1937), or is 
more oriented towards conflictual relations, power, and coercion - as in the orthodox 
Marxian position. Endorsing the latter view of society, as conflict-bound, leads to a critical, 
emancipatory perspective.  
PLACE TABLE 1 HERE  
It is through a thematic analysis of these contributions that the three paradigms were 
developed. An important consideration in this exercise was to set out a typology which was 
relevant, conceptually speaking, to the nature of risk in social life but also germane to social 
work practice. In this regard, having a ‘critical’ paradigm was important in terms of social 
work’s strident commitmment to anti-oppressive practice. Moreover, the categories of 
‘objectivism’ and ‘subjectivism’ seemed appropriate for an examination of risk as they 
sourced different methodological approaches to risk assessment.  
As can be seen from the table, each paradigm adopts a particular position on ontology, 
epistemology, axiology and methodology. Taking objectivism first, it propounds the 
ontological view that social phenomena exist independently of human agents. Here, social 
phenomena present as external facts which constrain or enable social action. 
Epistemologically, it suggests we can provide ‘objective’ representations of the social world 
in an accurate, valid and reliable manner. Reality can be discovered and communicated to 
others. Aligned to this supposition, it contends that knowledge claims are testable through 
empirical observation or experiment. From an axiological stance, by way of contrast, 
objectivism advances the view that scientific inquiry should be a neutral affair, one that is 
value-free and dispassionate. In discovering facts we cannot progress to moral assertions as 
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they are two distinctive categories which must not be conflated. This is what proponents of 
the paradigm refer to as the inviolable, fact-value distinction. 
Objectivism relies on modes of inquiry that are sourced by positivism. This doctrine asserts 
the only reliable knowledge is of the scientific kind. Positivism directs the inquirer to search 
for causal relationships and encourages the deductive testing of theory and hypotheses. It 
also leans towards a nomothetic orientation; that is, a search for general laws. That said, it is 
important to point out at this juncture that approaches to positivism have been tempered 
or even contested by various philosophers (for example, Popper (1968)) and social 
commentators (for instance, Benton and Craib (2001)). Thus, when it comes to 
contemporary sociological versions, the claimed neutrality of positivist methods has come 
under question particularly when it is conceded that observer bias may always be present in 
investigation even to a small degree. What is more, the sanctity of positivism’s metaphysical 
premises has been overtaken by a focus on quantitative methods as the quintessential 
feature defining this approach. With this comes the pursuit of trustworthy data acquisition 
and analysis. Thus, positivism in modern social science is often seen as synonymous with 
applying scientific methods to study social phenomena without necessarily maintaining a 
rigid commitment to the approach’s metaphysical claims concerning reality.  
The afore-mentioned modes of inquiry give rise to the use of actuarial models in risk 
assessement in human welfare contexts. Such models, it is contended, enable the inquirer 
to reach an understanding of the level of seriousness of risk in a particular case rather than 
to predict specifically the occurrence of future harm (Shlonsky & Wagner, 2005). Hence, 
they must be seen as risk classification tools. It is contended, by some, that actuarial models 
can rightly claim the mantle of the ‘gold standard’ of assessment approaches (Schwalbe, 
2009). This is justified on the grounds they draw on positivist principles to identify risk 
factors which are statistically significant in reaching a considered formulation about 
dangerousness within families.  Human subjectivity is curtailed as the respondant applies 
the model to score various categories thus minimising the distorting effects of unstructured, 
human judgement.  
Subjectivism typically presents an antithetical view to the fore-going tenets. Thus, when it 
comes to the area of ontology, it proposes a model of voluntarism (Giddens, 1987) whereby 
individual actors are not ‘cultural dopes’ but rather exercise their intentions, hopes, choices 
and decisions. In effect, they exercise their freedom to change themselves and social 
structures. Two other dimensions of subjectivist ontology are also apparent, namely: 
nominalism and solipsism. In relation to the former, the contention is that things of a 
conceptual nature have a real existence (for example, ideas). As regards the latter, the 
assertion that consciousness ‘is all that there is’, is contrary to a materialist position where 
matter is believed to be the primary reality. Taking a different vein, some proponents of 
subjectivism advocate the view that knowledge is a social construction. It is not that there is 
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a real world out there and we map our communication onto it; instead, according to certain 
post-structuralist philosophers, we create and reproduce this world through our continuing 
communication about it. 
When it comes to axiology, subjectivism defends the value-laden nature of social inquiry. It 
is maintained that it is impossible to exclude the inquirer’s values and the way they shape 
problem-definitions, choices, interpretations and decisions. The insurmountable divorce 
between the inquirer and what she or he studies, becomes untenable as everything 
succumbes to a perspectival gloss including science itself. To claim value-neutrality is to 
unintentionally endorse prevailing values inherent within the status-quo.  
These ontological and epistemological premises shape modes of inquiry within subjectivism. 
Prominent here is phenomenology (the study of inner consciousness), hermeneutics (an 
inquiry into meaning), and social constructionism (the belief that social life is socially 
produced as opposed to naturally given). In addition, whereas objectivism is allied with a 
nomothetic stance (where the search for general patterns is to the fore), subjectivism leads 
to idiographic inquiry – focusing on cultural and historical particulars. In addition, it veers 
towards an inductive form of fact-finding, one where statements and ideas about the social 
world are drawn from a series of observations. Such meta-theoretical premises give rise to a 
distinctive approach to risk. Here, we see the use of structured judgement by professionals, 
attempts to extrapolate meaning from the various actors concerned in the risk situation, the 
application of heuristics of analysis (or short hand ways to making sense of complex 
scenarios) and reflexive accounts whereby risk assessors deliberate on ‘facts and feelings’ to 
gain a better understanding of predisposing and situational hazards. In a more developed 
version of this approach, risk assessors weigh up risk factors previously agreed consensually 
by experts. This has been referred to as a consensus model (Barber et al, 2008). 
The objectivist and subjectivist paradigms can be counterpoised with the critical paradigm. 
The latter adopts the ontological position that social reality is both produced by humans but 
also exists in an objective sense. Bhaskar (1979) helpfully captures this notion in his 
metaphor of the scupltress (synonymous with the creative human agent) fashioning a 
material entity (representative of substantive social structure). Epistemologically, this 
paradigm argues that knowledge - of ourselves, others and the social world - can be used to 
highlight contradictions, distorted ideology, and oppressive discourse. Moreover, it can be 
used to develop ideal standards for appraising social life. Habermas (1986) expressed this 
well in his clarion call for an emancipatory science based on communicative rationality. For 
him, this embraced both positivism and hermeneutics but also moved beyond them to a 
new and different sphere of understanding of the social world where primacy was given to 
critical reflection and discourse. 
In another vein, the critical paradigm unequoivocally asserts that, contra positivism, we can 
derive values from facts. Bhaskar and Habermas are two leading proponents of this 
5 
 
contention.  More specifically, they argue there is an unassailable linkage between 
epistemology and human emancipation. Taking things as they stand, it is better for people 
to hold true rather than false beliefs because of their respective outcomes for human 
actors. For them, it is possible, therefore, to provide ‘an objective grounding to certain 
critical value judgements, and so to justify an emancipatory project of social change’ 
(Benton and Craib, 2001, p. 137).  
For Bhasker, this means identifying the underlying and often deep-rooted mechanisms that 
either work for human betterment and those, conversely, leading to deleterious outcomes. 
For instance, the fact that societies in the west have moved from a manufacturing to a 
consumptive-oriented mode of production has reinforced, wholesale, the mechanism of 
commodificaton. As a result, people become objects in the neo-liberal market. The task, 
here, for Bhaskar, is to not only identify these negative mechanisms but ameliorate them. 
This emancipatory principle applies to risk analysis where intrinsic mechanisms, affecting 
risk outcomes, operate within the person and also the wider, ecological environment. For 
example, a person’s innate resilience might enable them to withstand the effects of a risk-
laden environment where poor human attachments exist.  On a wider plane, access to social 
support and social capital might offset a potential negative chain reaction in a child’s life. 
However, countervailing mechanisms may also be detected. On the psychological plane, 
children may develop insecure attachment profiles and live in socially impoverished 
environments ostensibly compromised by gender-related, racial and cultural inequalities.  
It is important at this juncture to consider the strengths and weaknesses of each paradigm. 
Objectivism views risk as real and objective.  It brings with it the fruits of the scientific 
method to provide an objective calculation of events. In doing so, it mitigates the bias 
inherent in contested fields such as child protection where cognitive blocks to recognition 
have been shown to intrude into decision-making (Munro, 1999). Moreover, it is accepted 
that some actuarial tools have a high predictive validity and credible inter-rater reliability 
(D’Andrade et al, 2005). Hence, they are likely to generate robust information for very busy, 
time-strapped professionals. That said, the continuing problem of the ‘false positive’ and 
‘false negative’ continues to taint the overall value of such instruments particularly when 
they are applied to rare events such as serious child abuse. Consequently, they net a 
significant number of ‘sharks’ but also ‘minnows’. More than this, actuarial tools do not in 
themselves take sufficient account of a child’s social context nor how spatial and temporal 
arrangements change radiply to alter risk-profiles and trajectories. Social meaning and 
understanding is therefore a vital pre-requisite for using the actuarial tool. It can only be but 
one (important) resource in the professional’s tool kitbag. 
Subjectivism, with its emphasis on social meaning and context, helps to ameliorate these 
afore-mentioned difficiencies within the positivist approach to risk. Moreover, it seeks to 
understand (through phenomenology) and interpret (through hermeneutics) the actor’s 
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views of events. Crucially, if actors define a situation as real, it is real in its effects. What are 
presented as objective risks are subjectively perceived aspects of a person’s life. 
Furthermore, real risk may be socially mediated by the social fields within which actors 
operate. As Douglas (1992) strikingly found, real risks are altered by cultural boundaries. So, 
subjectivism’s emphasis on the meaning-making activies of the actor, including the risk 
situations they are embroiled in, must surely be its formative strength.  Yet, as indicated 
above, our interpretations of events are notoriously compromised by bias or perhaps an 
ingrained habitus. We use heuristics to focus on information that is readily available or 
representative, discounting other possibilities. Or, we search for information that supports 
our pre-exisiting view and reject information which invalidates it. Inevitably, making sense 
of other people’s sense-making activities – the double hermeneutic – is a fraught 
undertaking. Just as objectivism needs subjectivism to make it situationally sensitive, so 
subjectivism needs objectivism to provide it with detached rigour. 
Moving on, the critical paradigm promulgates the unassailable fact that risk in human 
welfare is embued with oppression, inequality and asymmetrical power relations. This is one 
of its core contribution to the debate on risk. The connection between child abuse and 
poverty is irrefutable. As Munro (2007) cogently argues, social professionals are in danger of 
priviliging psychological explanations of child maltreatment, neglecting social aetiology. The 
critical paradigm also reinforces the vital idea that risk-related events in social life are 
caused by unseen mechanisms which we cannot observe empirically. This forces the 
assessor to construct and subsequently test hypotheses about them.  In taking these much 
needed steps, the risk assessor is taking account of deep causality. This form of realist 
inquiry is known as retroduction. However, attempting to adopt it may not be as simple as it 
seems. Constructing and testing hypotheses about deep causal mechanisms is a complex 
process which may be more fitting for social researchers rather than busy practitioners in 
child protection.  The challenges of applying the critical paradigm in practice are 
consequently to the fore. 
If this meta-theoretical typology is accepted, where does all of this leave us? If we were to 
follow Thomas Kuhn (2012), we would answer the question by saying the three paradigms 
were incommensurable, presenting irreconcilable ontological, epistemological and 
methodological premises. Consequently, obeying the law on non-contradiction, the inquirer 
might be left with no option but to select (what he or she considered to be) the most 
enlightened paradigm to explain her lived reality, thereby rejecting the other two. From a 
purely logical point of view, Kuhn was right. However, when it comes to risk in child welfare, 
there might be strong arguments in favour of avoiding ontological closure and separatism 
within meta-theory (even if merited by abstract logic) and encouraging a more pragmatist 
stance, one adhering to paradigmatic pliability. Put more simply, there might be much to 
gain from aligning all three paradigms (even though this might induce uncomfortable 
tensions) when it comes to the issue of risk in child welfare. This is to side-step the 
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internecine risk wars referred to earlier and encourage an exchange of ideas across what 
might be re-framed as more porous boundaries between the paradigms. More moderate 
expressions might facilitate points of alignment, or convergence. Put in another way, real-
life investigators are unlikely to adopt a strong, purist or traditional version of any particular 
paradigm. Perspectives are more likely to be two-eyed. Let us consider, for example, the 
tenets of a moderate form of objectivism in social inquiry. Here, objectivism is tempered 
with subjectivist notions. Layder (1997) is an advocate of this re-worked position. For him, 
‘the objective realm of social phenomena must be recognised and properly analysed’ (p. 
10). Yet, in arguing this point, he maintains that the viewpoint of the actor is of critical 
importance. This is because actors socially construct their realities even though the 
objective world exits outside of them. Society is viewed as the outcome of human 
perception and activity but constrains and enables that activity by imposing rules, rituals 
and norms on it. Here, we can see how objectivism and subjectivism have been aligned 
pragmatically.  
There are other philosophical and sociological precedents for this pragmatist stance. Isaiah 
Berlin (2003), for instance, extolled the view that seemingly competing, incommensurate 
perspectives could be reconciled in a creative, pluralistic fusion without succumbing to a 
relativist abyss. Echoing this stance, Nicos Mouzelis called for a conceptual pragmatism 
between paradigms of thought in the social sciences based on the ‘criteria of utility rather 
than truth (1995, p. 7). In a comparative vein, George Ritzer (1980) argued for paradigm 
linking, leaping, bridiging and integrating. Lastly, the philosopher and theologian Paul Tillich 
(1966) surmised that the ‘boundary’ between dichotomous perspectives was often the most 
creative of places to rest, in terms of knowledge acquisition.  
Deliberating on the boundaries between objectivist, subjectivist and critical paradigms of 
risk, and thereby harnessing important insights from each in a synergistic way, leads me to 
develop a resultant, derivative position I have dubbed ‘methodological pragmatism’. This 
not simply an amalgam of different premises from each paradigm; rather, it is a gestalt – a 
conceptualisation that is more than the ‘sum of the parts’. Methodological pragmatism 
takes on its own particular hue even though it is indebted to core ideas within the three 
paradigms outlined earlier. Critically, however, I have not constructed it as a fourth 
paradigm as it does not possess the internal consistency required of this meta-theoretical 
construct (Kuhn, 2012).  As a derivative position, I contend methodological pragmatism 
makes a number of salient propositions about the social world and risk. These are set out 
below. 
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Core Propositions Underpinning Methodological Pragmatism and Risk  
(i)       Approaches to risk should hold objectivist and subjectivist perspectives together 
in a creative tension. This results in method triangulation whereby social workers 
use the most sensitive, specific, actuarial models (derived from the objectivist 
paradigm) but also attend to the contextual and situational factors affecting 
actors’ meanings (which are part and parcel of a subjectivist orientation). How the 
service user views his or her life, signifcant others, key events and so on, places 
actuarial findings in an important context ostensibly qualifying initial formulations 
on risk in a more nuanced and situation-specific manner. Not only that, a focus on 
objective risk factors, without attending to the social context within which they 
are imbedded, can potentially skew or distort their real significance. For example, 
a social worker needs to understand how a step-parent (a risk factor in many risk-
assessment schedules) is perceived by the child in whose care she resides. It 
might be that the child is deeply attached to her step-father. It could be that the 
step-father sees himself as the child’s psychological parent - genetic differences 
being put to one side. These emotional affiliations mollify any potential concerns 
arising from the presence of a step-father in the home. Similarly, a parent who 
has committed a criminal offence (say tax fraud) is unlikely to pose any risk to a 
child. It is the nature of the offence, its meaning and context, that is all important.  
Informed risk assessments in social work must attend to meaning, time and place. 
(ii)       Importantly, risk assessors will necessarily adopt various types of hermeneutic 
analysis. First, they should adopt an insider perspective, seeing the world from the 
service user’s point of view, particularly as regards the risk factors in their lives. 
Then again, secondly, it means looking at these meanings from a different angle, 
asking questions and puzzling over different interpretations.  This process can be 
described as moving from a hermeneutic of empathy to a hermeneutic of 
questioning. Lastly, and more than that, it involves social workers engaging in the 
double-hermeneutic when approaching situations of risk. That is, they are trying 
to make sense of service users attempting to make sense of their experience. 
Accordingly, social workers’ sense-making activity is of a second-order kind. 
Moreover, as this is a complex task, it is best undertaken in the context of 
supportive, reflective supervision. It is also a matter of intelligent, accurate, 
empathetic perspective-taking with service users. This commitment humanises 
risk assessment in social work, placing the person at the centre of inquiry. Service 
users cannot be reduced to an objective list of risk factors. A hermeneutic of 
empathy builds from an ethic of care recognising how service users might struggle 
with internal and external stressors and surrounding hazards. Hence, risk 
assessment in social work is a person-centred process not just a technical activity. 
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(iii)       Risk assessors, in line with the critical paradigm, should investigate the deep 
causal mechanisms leading to harm and well-being and, importantly, locate 
oppressive mechanisms lying below the surface of everyday experience. This 
involves a process of identifying causal mechanisms within the person (such as 
personality traits) and various domains of social life (for example, rules governing 
social interaction). Once these mechanisms have been identified, social workers 
must seek to mitigate those causing harm (for example, insecure attachment and 
stigma in children and young people) and strengthen those leading to positive 
effects (for instance, resilience, social support, and emotional literacy). 
(iv)      What makes methodological pragmatism unique (as a position) is the manner in 
which ‘facts and feelings’ emanating from the application of (i), (ii) and (iii) are 
processed holistically. This is a matter of sifting through hypotheses developed 
from positivist, hermeneutic and critical conceptions and integrating them where 
possible to provide multi-faceted explanations. This is best done communicatively 
with others to make linkages, form hypotheses and, crucially, enact reflexivity. It 
is like seeing life through each side of a prism and moving to a centre-point in the 
middle where a leap in understanding occurs.  For social workers, such insight 
informs practice knowledge which, for Trevithick (2009), ‘describes how 
knowledge can be used in different practice situations to produce sound 
judgements and effective decision-making’ (p. 43).     
(v)      Risk assessment in child welfare is both fact and value-laden. For example, a 
parent who fails to turn up for a contact visit with his child is an event that is 
indisputably the case. Yet, it can be viewed subjectively and has ethical 
connotations, particularly if the event has caused some kind of harm. Every 
pronouncement on risk therefore has a moral dimension. Social workers need to 
be trained as technicists, therefore, in the science of risk appraisal but also need 
to understand how to process complex, ethical quandaries. It is here that an 
understanding of moral philosophy becomes both helpful and required.  
In all of this, social workers apply practical reasoning to make sense of the facts 
and feelings emerging from risk assessment. According to the philosopher 
Alisdair MacIntyre (1999), practical reasoning occurs when a person thinks 
critically about his or her natural attitude (which was referred to earlier): her 
views, perceptions and judgements and shares them with others as part of a 
collaborative discussion. Moreover, practical reasoning is a matter of reflecting 
on whether the basis of one’s thoughts and actions are credible and supported 
by justifiable, ethical reasons. To reiterate, this is not only a cognitive activity but 
a moral and collective one aimed at building virtue in social workers particularly 
when it is habituated. For Pullen-Sansfacon (2010), practical reasoning is the key 
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pedagogical medium through which social workers build and sustain virtue in 
their practice. She proposes that social work students are encouraged to apply 
Socratic dialogue as one pedagogical strategy for developing practical reasoning.  
(vi)       From an ontological standpoint, the social actor is a complex social being, and, as 
a consequence of past psycho-biographical experience, might well show 
ambivalence or resort to defence mechanisms to protect a vulnerable identity. 
This is especially true in cases where unmet emotional needs are to the fore. 
While phenomenological approaches to risk are necessary, they cling to an overly 
rational view of the actor, neglecting these areas. Risk assessment in child welfare 
must therefore take into account emotion, human attachment, object-relations 
and the unconscious - but not in an overly deterministic way. In child protection, 
powerful psycho-dynamic processes – transference, projective identification, and 
splitting – operate particularly when professional authority has to be exercised. In 
this context, Reder et al (1999) have argued convincingly that unmet care and 
control needs feature strongly in the psycho-biographies of parents and care-
givers who seriously harm their children. For these authors, social workers must 
be attentive to psycho-dynamic processes particularly in the context of how they 
balance care and control responses when faced with risk-laden situations. Rustin 
(2005) concurs with this recommendation adding that social workers need to be 
mindful of how they unconsciously avoid pain in child protection. For her, 
mindfulness is the antidote to mindless practice. 
(vii)     Social life exhibits a number of collective properties that historically emerge to 
form objective features which provide a wider context for understanding risk. For 
example, families often follow established, pre-existing rules, routines and norms 
outlining the possibilities and constraints of social interaction. Risk assessors must 
become acquainted with these taken-for-granted, objective aspects of family life 
if they are to put behaviours within a meaningful context. Parenting assessments 
in social work must focus on these rules and norms. For example, how are roles 
within the family allocated? How is communication structured? In what way is 
decision-making enacted? There may be rules relating to the behavioural 
management of children which are important for social work assessors to 
understand. Families use distinctive methods of making sense of their worlds. 
When social workers gain insight into these methods they are adhering to 
ethnomethodology – a primary method of investigation within the subjectivist 
paradigm (de Montigny, 2007). 
(viii)    Oppressive, social mechanisms affecting risk do not operate independently of 
people but have properties that are not reducible to them. For instance, poverty 
exists as a real, objective dimension sui generis. While people live with and 
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experience poverty, we cannot explain it solely in terms of their perceptions or 
reactions. Moreover, parents of children ‘in need’ should not be blamed for their 
pecuniary status. Poverty has its own defining mechanisms (such as the barriers it 
presents to various forms of capital) which need to be understood in a 
comprehensive risk assessment. Another way of putting this is to say that human 
activities involving risk are the outcome of the dual influence of external (macro) 
factors and situational (micro) factors. In this interplay inequality affects life 
outcomes and heightens risk profiles and careers. 
(ix)      Risk should be seen in the context of the influence of different domains of social 
life: self, social interaction, institution, culture and economy. These domains are 
distinct yet connected. Another way of putting this is to say that risk outomes are 
affected by the interplay between human agency and social structure. This 
imbrication takes place within time and space. The level and seriousness of risk in 
child welfare may consequently change when actors move to different settings or 
through the simple passage of time. To reiterate, risk should be seen in the 
context of agency, structure, time and place.  
(x)      Power operates pervasively in social life to effect and reinforce asymmetries in 
social relationships and positions based on gender, racial, cultural and class-based 
differences. Power is variegated and often disciplinary placing subjects under 
surveillance and control. Risk assessors in child welfare must be aware of their 
own power, its potential for pacifying, excluding and normalising less powerful 
groupings subject to the professional ‘gaze’.  Power, though, also has an enabling 
dimension and it is here that risk practices should be seen as empowering growth 
and purposeful change. 
The afore-mentioned propositions cohere around a number of recurring and salient features 
of methodological pragmatism that have a direct bearing on risk assessment in child 
welfare. It is worth rehearsing them. First, given the ontological significance of the different 
domains of life, it is vital that risk assessment keeps to an ecological focus. That is, it is 
necessary to understand the person-in-society nexus. Risk factors exist with the person and 
also within wider social, cultural and economic mileux. Second, risk assessment must move 
from being a surface appraisal (of facts and feelings) to one of depth. It is important here 
that risk assessors are attuned to ‘deep causality’ for the social world is not a flat, 
featureless terrain. Unless this insight is apprehended, change might be difficult to achieve. 
To reiterate: risk assessment must have epistemological depth for this allows the inquirer to 
understand not only  what the actor is doing but also how and why she is doing it. 
Third, risk assessment must avail of triangulation using different types of tool co-
terminously – some more objectively oriented, others attuned to subjective approaches 
such as structured observation. It is only through triangulation we can hope to enhance the 
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validity and reliability of assessment. Fourth, this position highlights the ethical nature of 
risk assessment and intervention and, primarily, that it should lead to human emancipation 
and well-being. This is congruent with anti-oppressive social work practice. Risk calculation 
is not an end in itself; instead it ought to be a means to a humanistic end. Fifth, 
methodological pragmatism is deeply concerned with the meaning service users attribute to 
their experience. It values a perspectival stance and, with it, the importance of professional 
reflexivity – given that social workers are also meaning-oriented actors. However, reflexivity 
raises the need for considered supervision and support. Hence, the supervisor must be open 
to the tenets of methodological pragmatism as much as the practitioner. Lastly, there is an 
archeological theme underpinning this position. This suggests that advanced social work 
practice must not only strive to apprehend and apply relevant substantive theory (to explain 
events in the empirical world) but also to delve deeper into the meta-theoretical substratum 
underpinning each and every aspect of the lifecourse. This return to meta-theoretical 
preliminaries engenders a consideration of the interconnection between knowledge, ‘being’ 
and wider moral arguments about risk in child welfare. 
Conclusion 
In this paper I have described some of the first-order, meta-theoretical premises 
underpinning risk assessment in child welfare to contribute to a growing debate about the 
nature of risk in child welfare. Three governing paradigms were identifed and their 
component parts explained. This critical review subsequently led to the development of a 
composite position and, with it, a number of propositions about the fundamental nature of 
risk assessment. This project has been about defending philosophy in a run away world that 
priviliges instrumentalism in social life, reinforces social relations and devalues deep critical 
inquiry. It is about valuing and respecting the complexity of philosphical investigation. By 
returning to this level of deep understanding and integration we can enhance our 
knowledge of the person-in-society and the risks he or she faces and presents. It is to 
acknowledge there is a real world out there but one that we dimly perceive much like the 
incumbents in Plato’s cave. Advancing our understanding of meta-theory casts further light 
on the walls of this enclosure so we can grasp the nature of reality with even greater 
confidence. I contend meta-theoretical awareness should become an integral part of social 
work education so that students become increasingly open to this deep level of 
understanding – and comfortable using the vernacular that explains it. Social work 
education must revel in subtleties, contradictions and lacunae enabling students to become 
more adept explorers of the social world in all its dimensions. 
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